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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Appellant wishes to bring to the attention of the 
court vital discrepancies in facts as stated by Appellant's 
Brief and by Respondent's Brief. 
Respondent chose not to respond to the Statement of 
Facts in Appellant's Brief. Rather, respondent wrote its own 
Statement of Facts with no reference to Appellant's Brief. 
Rule 75{p)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required that the 
Respondent's Brief in stating facts must address itself 
specifically to the Appellant's Brief and, if it disagreed with 
the facts stated in such brief, to specify the facts disagreed 
with, the basis of the disagreement, and precise citations from 
the transcript to rebut the Appellant's statement and to 
support the Respondent's. 
Rule 75 (p) (2) was repealed wh(en the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure were enacted. It would seem to have been 
replaced by the requirement of Rule 40(a) of URAP that the 
attorney's signature to a pleading before the Utah Supreme 
Court constitutes a certificate that the attorney's pleading is 
well founded in fact and law, is a good faith argument, and is 
not interposed for any improper purpose. 
In this case the loss of 75(p)(2), URCP is felt. 
Instead of having the two briefs directly relate to each other 
in regard to the facts, there is no such confrontation so as to 
guide the court as to who has accurately stated the facts, 
because Respondent's Brief, in its Statement of Facts, simply 
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ignores Appellant's Brief. 
This leaves the reviewing court with the burden of 
independently checking the transcript to determine whose 
Statement of Facts is accurate. 
This Brief is intended to assist in that 
determination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CLARIFICATION OF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PHASE I 
Appellants (Perkins) take the position that if in 
their Statement of Facts they alleged certain facts, supported 
by citations to the Record, and Respondent (Interlake) neither 
admits nor denies those facts, but simply ignores them, that 
the facts are deemed admitted, as this conforms to the general 
rule of pleadings, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(d). 
The basis for this assumption of AppelLant, is that if 
Appellant had stated facts inaccurately, not supported by the 
Record, the Respondent would have rebutted the misstatements. 
Lacking rebuttal to such specific, documented facts, they 
should retain standing as being uncontested. 
Certain factual matters need to be addressed for 
clarification. Three will be reviewed in this Point, and 
another in Point III. 
1. Interlakefs Knowledge, or Lack Thereof, that 
Perkins were Retaining An Interest in the Property. 
Interlake states repeatedly in its Brief that it had 
no actual, nor constructive, notice of Perkins1 retained 
interest. Interlake states in its Respondent's Brief at Point 
III: "The lender received no actual or constructive notice of 
seller's retained interests." 
This Point states in part ff... no information was 
given to the lender (Interlake) as to the subsequent retained 
interest by the seller in the property by any of the parties or 
fiduciaries involved...There was nothing to alert the lender of 
any subsequent retained interest in the property by the 
seller.ff (Respondent's Brief, P. 22-23) 
These statements by Interlake are not factually 
accurate. Rather, Interlake had an indifference to Perkins1 
retained interest as Mr. Adams testified (R 1331, L4-7) in an 
apparent attempt to insure itself of a first position 
regardless of the Perkins' interest. Mr. Adams, who handled 
all transactions for Interlake as its branch manager, testified 
on this point. He tacitly admitted that he knew Perkins had a 
retained sellers' interest to which he was indifferent. 
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f,Q. And you wanted all of this to constitute 
a lien standing ahead of the Perkins? 
A. Yes, that's true, 
Q. And you never considered whether Perkins 
would agree to be second to those amounts or 
interest rates? 
A. I never considered whether anyone would. 
My specific instructions were to be solely 
in a first position with no other liens or 
encumbrances in front of us." 
(R. 1039, L. 10-25) [Emphasis added] 
Nor did Mr. Adams, Interlake's manager, 
specifically deny that he did have actual knowledge of 
Perkins' retained interest: 
MQ. Mr. Adams, tell me again when it was 
that you first found out about the second 
mortgage position of the Perkins'? 
A. To my knowledge, it was approximately 
October of 1981. 
Q. Are you absolutely certain that Mr. 
Coombs did not inform you about that prior 
to October? 
A. He could have possibly mentioned it at 
the time of the initial loan. I 
truthfully cannot remember. And if he--
and if he had, it is of no consequence to me 
at that time anyway. 
Q. But you are not suggesting that he 
didn't inform you; is that correct? 
A. No. I'm not saying that he didn't. I 
don't recall that he did." 
(R. 1329, L. 7-21) [Emphasis added.] 
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P e r k i n s b e 1 i e v e t h a t t he en i e s 11 o n • : f I n t e r 1 a k e f s 
knowledge of Perkins' retained interest is in dispute. The 
trial cour t made no specific finding as to lnterlake fs 
knowledge, actual or constructive. Perkins believe that the 
facts and the law applied to the facts show that Interlake 
had
 £: 11: ] eas t a cons tin ic t i < re know 1 edge of ?e r k i ns f ret a i ned 
interest* Although not determinative of the issue of 
priority, Perkins believe this point to be important in 
de t e r mi n i rig t he a 1 lo c a t i o n :) £ du t i e s be twe e n the parties 
involved. 
2. Interlake fs Representation That The Recording of 
the Documents Followed the Intent of the Parties. 
Interlake asserts that the recording of the Trust 
Deeds involved, Interlake fs first, Perkins' second, "•.. 
followed the intent of the parties M (Respondent's Brief, 
P. 14, Section (d)). This is apparently part of Interlake's 
continuing e£fort:s to blind itself to integra 1 port ions of 
Perkins f Earnest Money Agreement regarding the limitations 
which would apply to a loan to which they would agree to 
subordinate. It is curious how Interlake can assert that this 
particular sequence of recording was its intent when it also 
states: ,fLender was not aware of the ... fact that Buyer 
intended to grant Seller a second trust deed." (Interlake ?s 
Brief, P. 7, Section 5 ) . 
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3. Alleged Insignificance and Immateriality of 
Differences Between Interlake's Loan and Authorization of 
Earnest Money. 
From Interlake's incomplete statement of the 
provision of the Earnest Money Agreement (Respondent's 
Statement of Facts, paragraph 13), to its suggestion that 
CICfs actual loan did not have material or substantial 
differences from the earnest money terms (Respondent's Brief, 
P. 25), Interlake ignores the complete language of the earnest 
money document and infers that the only real term was that 
Perkins would subordinate to the lender. This is contrary to 
the trial court's specific findings that Perkins had agreed to 
subordinate to a loan of approximately $17,000 at 14% interest 
(Findings of Facts, Section 3, Perkins1 Brief, Addendum 1, p. 
4), and that the loan Interlake made to CIC "was not 
approximately $17,000 at 14% interst." (Findings of Fact, 
Section 12, p. 5). 
It is also in contradiction of the only expert 
testimony offered, that by Rodney Pipella, in-house counsel 
for Security Title Company• Mr. Pipella testified that an 
interest rate difference of 4% is significant and not 
approximately the same (Pipella testimony, R. 1122, L. 14-16), 
and that a loan for $20,000 is a significant variation to the 
"approximately $17,000" as in Perkins' Earnest Money Agreement 
(Pipella testimony, R. 1195, L. 2-11). 
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PHASE II 
The discrepancies in fact between Appellant's and 
Re s po nden t, s B r : e f a r e s uf f i• :: i e n 11 \ c 1 e ar • zut " \ •= '„.;:.;.--
Briefs that response here is not needed• 
II. KEM? MAY BE CONTROLLING, BUT 
INTERLAKETS ANALOGY IS UNFOUNDED 
Interlakefs excerpting a portion of the Kemp v. Zionfs 
First Nat yl Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288, 470 p.2d 390 < 1 ? ? J opinion 
and highlighting" various phrases therein .- ....-_ _ent 
illustration of one ''failing to see the forest for the trees." 
Interlake attempts to identify isolated factual 
similarities between Kemp and the instant case in an effort to 
persuade the court that the total factual! circumstances of this 
action warrants the courtf s abandonment of the general rule of 
purchase money vendor priority, as was found in Kemp. 
Interlake attempts to clothe itself in the role of the bank in 
Kemp by attempting to draw parallels between specific facts in 
Kemp with facts in the instant action. The parallels are 
illusory at best. 
Numerous factual distinctions between Kemp and this 
case were addressed in Perkins' Appellantsf Brief, however, a 
few points made in Respondent's Brief should be addressed. 
For example, Interlake makes much of the similarity of 
an unrestrict warranty deed from the sellers which was relied 
on by the lenders. A closer look at the two situations shows 
the importance of the timing of the transactions plays in the 
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analysis. In Kemp, sellers conveyed their property to buyers 
by an unrestricted warranty deed, failed to record their own 
trust deed which would have given notice, and subsequently negotiated 
with the lender the terms of the buyer's loan without 
disclosing their interest. In the instant action, Interlake 
had negotiated its loan with CIC prior to Perkins having 
executed any warranty deed, which was executed contem-
poraneously with their vendor's trust deed and both were 
immediately recorded. No notice could be given from this, a 
major difference from Kemp. It is inconceivable how Interlake, 
which eagerly seeks to convince the court of its complete 
ignorance of any terms of the agreement between Perkins and 
CIC, could have placed reliance upon documents not yet in 
existence. 
Further, although the sellers in Kemp accepted 
proceeds directly from the lender after involvement in 
negotiating buyers1 loan, Perkins merely received funds at the 
closing which conformed to the expectations under the Earnest 
Money Agreement, and had no contact with Interlake whatsoever, 
let alone participate in the loan negotiations. 
POINT III. 
TERMS OF EARNEST MONEY'S CONDITIONAL 
SUBORDINATION NOT VAGUE OR MERE SURPLUSAGE 
In its Brief (P. 24-26, Point 5), Interlake appears to 
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suggest that the court should affirm thfe trial court's ruling 
either because the differences between the loan made to CIC and 
tha t au tho r i z ed 11: 1 11: 1 e e ar i 1 e s t mo i: iey we r e i ns i gni f I c ant: and 
immaterial, or that the terms in the earnest money were vague 
or over] y broad and i unenforceable. 
The court found that the Perkins had agreed to 
subordinate to a loan of approximately $17,000 at 14% interest 
( F indi ng s • : • f F ac t Sec t Ion 3 2 , Pe r kI ns " B r ie f , Adde i: ldi nil ,3 p . 
6 ) , and that the actual loan of $20,700+ at 18% interest was not 
approximately $17,000 at 14% interest. The length cf -he loan 
CIC could take was not speL..ej :•--. the earnest ::?•-::e Based 
on this, Judge Fishier found: 
"14. The Earnest Money Agreement of September 25, 
1980, was vague with no definite terms and 
conditions so as to compute • an exact amount of 
the Subordination Agreement:. Mr. and Mrs. 
Perkins had a duty to clarify tjtiose terms as the 
Earnest Money Agreement of September 25, 1980, 
was used as the escrow instructions for the 
Perkins to the title company to prepare the 
closing papers. In addition, Mr. and Mrs. 
Perkins had a duty to speak up and to clarify 
those areas where they may have had any question 
or concern. They failed to inquire as to the 
terms and conditions at the closing, in lightof 
the fact that the amount of the subordination had 
not been fully agreed upon.M 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 14, Addendum I, Appellants1 
Brief.) 
In this, Perkins believe, Judge Fishier erred. None of 
the experts at the closing, including Mbr. Williams, commented 
-9-
on the unknown term of the CIC loan. A reasonable period was 
assumed and that particular term has never been a point of 
dispute. 
In regard to the Earnest Money Agreement's language of 
"approximately $17,000 at 14%," this does not constitute 
vagueness. 
The evidence before the court established that this 
type of language in earnest money agreements was quite a common 
practice. Expert witness Rodney Pipella, in-house counsel for 
Security Title Company, indicated that in his experience in 
closing real estate transactions, he would "constantly11 have 
occasions where such language as "apprximately $17,000 at 14%" 
was used to describe loan authorizations. (Pipella testimony, 
R. 1108, L. 11-15), and that this is used for people to 
estimate the amount of the debt burden that they are willing to 
subordinate to. (Pipella testimony, R. 1107, L. 19-24). Mr. 
Paul Scott,CICfs real estate agent, further testified that the 
language in the earnest money was to place a limitation on the 
loan CIC could obtain that Perkins would subordinate to (Scott 
testimony, R. 1235, L. 1235 ?, L 16-20; R. 1236, L. 18-22) and 
that "approximately" would mean less than a $1,000 variance 
(Scott testimony, R. 1266, L. 16-18; R. 1272, L. 20-21). 
Nor can it be argued that the language used, 
"approximately $17,000 at 14% interest," in any way effected 
the actions of Interlake in making its loan to CIC, for it 
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repeatedly insists that It made its loan to CIC without any 
knowledge of wl lat CIC s agreement was with the Perkins, 
Interlakefs suggestion that Perkins, by their Earnest 
Money Agreement: actually consented - ? subordinate to any lean 
obtained by CIC is, therefore, seer --.- contrary l * ne ecu: r "' s 
specific ruling that $17,000 it 14% is not $20,700 at :.4\ 
(Findings of r act, Sect: on 12), As a point of interest, the 
case of Troj v. Chesebro, Conn,, 269 A, 2d 685 (19 1 ., vhich 
Interlake alleges does not support Perkinsf position herein 
(see Respondent's 3r lef, 2 22) star ids for the pr oposition 
that redl estate sales agreement is unenforceable under the 
st-:~ -- frauds where it merely provides for the seller to 
subordinate to development and construction mortgages , without 
specifying terms of limitation on those mortgages. That is, a 
vague, incomplete, loan authorization 'is not a basis for a 
lender to obtain priority over the seller <. 
POINT IV. 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGE!^ 
At page 27 of Interlakefs Brief it argues "Seller had a 
duty to mitigate his damages in the foreclosure of the Trust 
Deed of November 27, 1981." 
The argument of Interlake is baised on a ruling made by 
the trial court that Perkins were limited in their damages 
because they had failed to mitigate them by bidding in and 
buying the home back after Coombs defaulted. (Findings of Fact, 
Phase II, Section 12, Perkins' Brief, Addendum II, Page 6) 
In his Bench Ruling on this point the trial court 
stated: 
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"The Court: One other thing. The court is 
going to allow an amendment to the pleadings 
in the case the court just ruled upon, and 
that's on the issue of mitigation of 
damages. 
Mr. Hunt did not plead mitigation of 
damages, but its readily apparent to the 
court that the mitigation of damages is an 
affirmative defense must be plead. And it 
has not been plead, but the court on its own 
motion is going to amend the pleadings. 
Because the evidence is, had the Perkins 
come in after the second default, and 
redeemed cheir property, they could have 
mitigated their damages totally." 
R. 982, L. 3-4. 
Perkins have addressed the question of mitigation in 
its Appellant's Brief, pp. 49-51. However, Perkins believe it 
was particularly improper in light of the agreement made 
between counsel as to the disposition of the property. 
Interlake and Perkins, through their attorneys, made 
an agreement, when Coombs had defaulted, that Interlake would 
sell the property and hold the proceeds in Trust until a 
decision by the court was made as to which party, Interlake or 
Perkins was entitled to the basic priority. Based on that 
agreement Perkins filed a release of their lis pendens. 
At the time of the ruling of Judge Fishier, the 
Perkins' attorney brought to the attention of the trial court 
that chis arrangement existed (R 984, L 7-16) and in all candor, 
i4r. Hunt acknowledged that the agreement existed (R 987, L 
1-6) . 
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In addition, Mr, Adams in' his testimony had 
acknowledged that Perkins and Interlake had an agreement that 
Perkins woin„d allnw Interlake to se" "' '""he property, subject to 
the ultimate judicial disposition the sale proceeds (R. 
138" 1J83, L. 6). 
It is perhaps because of this agreement betweei i the 
parties that Interlake did not plead nor pursue the issue of 
mitigation. 
Appellant's complaint now is that Interlake, having 
agreed that 1L had made the arrangement cannot now properly 
take advantage of the tria 1 coin tf s erroneous rul ing and 
pursue this as being a ground for limitation of Perkinsf 
damages on appeal. That j s, Interlake made the agreement that 
i 
it would sell the property and be ! good for the money if 
Perkins prevailed. Perkins relied on that agreement, withdrew 
its lis pendens and let Interlake sell, and now Interlake takes 
advantage of the trial court's error to breach its agreement 
with Perkins. 
CONCLUSION 
In Phase I, Perkins believe the trial court came to 
erroneous conclusions of law as to the determination of 
priority between Perkins and Interlake. Although there are 
various side issues involved, such as whether Interlake had 
knowledge of Perkins' retained interest, it is clear that the 
trial court's ruling is pegged to the imposition of a duty upon 
-13-
the Perkins to verify that the loan actually obtained by CIC 
conformed to the restrictions of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Perkins believe that the trial court erred on that point, and 
chat the facts, and law applied to those facts, demand a 
reversal of the trial court and entry of judgment in favor of 
the Perkins. 
In Phase II, Perkins believe tne trial court erred in 
its calculation of damages, and abused its discretion in 
failing to award punitive damages. 
DATED December 9, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ERIC P. HARTMAN 
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